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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of capital structure on a firm’s choice be-
tween vertical integration and outsourcing. Suppliers use debt as a strategic
instrument to collect the surplus from outsourcing, and their wealth constraint
or limited liability ensures them more attractive compensation schemes. In-
vestigating the buyer’s capital structure, we find that outsourcing with risky
debt is more likely to occur for high values of the outsourcing surplus.
Keywords: outsourcing, capital structure, incentives, uncertainty
JEL classification: D81; G32; G33; L23; L24
Outsourcing: the role of debt financing
This paper investigates the effect of capital structure on a firm’s choice be-
tween vertical integration and outsourcing. Suppliers use debt as a strategic
instrument to collect the surplus from outsourcing, and their wealth constraint
or limited liability ensures them more attractive compensation schemes. In-
vestigating the buyer’s capital structure, we find that outsourcing with risky
debt is more likely to occur for high values of the outsourcing surplus.
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1 Introduction
This paper extends the work by Teixeira (2011) by investigating the role of debt
on a firm’s decision to outsource. We show that as the surplus from outsourcing
gets larger, such that it is enough to cover the supplier’s limited liability rent, there
is scope for the supplier to issue debt, rather than accumulate cash. Debt has the
opposite effect of cash on the supplier’s value, and the supplier has the incentive
to issue as much debt as possible, provided that the buyer still chooses the out-
sourcing regime. Additionally, we find that the supplier’s debt is always risky as
its limited liability results in a compensation scheme where there are only positive
transfer payments in the good state of nature. In the bad state of nature the limited
liability constraint binds, and as a consequence the outsourcing transfer payment
is zero. Since the supplier’s debt is risky, it is associated with bankruptcy costs.
Our results show that the supplier’s decision of issuing debt represents a trade-off
between increased bargaining power in collecting the outsourcing surplus and higher
bankruptcy costs, and that the total firm value is maximized for maximum debt.
Furthermore, we find that the supplier’s equilibrium reaction with debt depends
on whether the buyer is outsourcing with safe or risky debt, as outsourcing with
risky debt involves bankruptcy costs that do not arise with safe debt. If the buyer’s
debt is safe, what determines the use of debt by the supplier is only the balance
between the surplus from outsourcing and the supplier’s limited liability rent. If,
however, the buyer’s debt is risky, there is a value loss in the buyer’s total firm value
due to bankruptcy costs, and as a consequence the supplier’s decision of issuing debt
has to take into account these additional costs.
We also examine how the level of priority of the firms’ creditors over the value
of production in bad states of nature affects the total firm value of each firm under
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outsourcing. We consider that, in addition to the transfer payments of the outsourc-
ing contract, the payoff to the firms’ creditors depends on a priority rule over the
value of production that remains to be transferred at liquidation. We find that each
firm’s creditors benefit from a higher level of priority over the value of production
in bad states of nature.
Finally, we find that the buyer’s decision to outsource with safe or risky debt
also depends on the magnitude of the surplus from the outsourcing contract, in
particular on how this surplus compares with the value of production in the bad
state of nature. Our model predicts that outsourcing with risky debt is more likely
to occur when there is a greater advantage from outsourcing. Moreover, we show
that the level of priority of the firm’s creditors over the value of production also plays
a role in the equilibrium capital structure: a higher level of priority of the buyer’s
creditors over this value favors an equilibrium where the buyer’s debt is safe.
Before proceeding, we further contrast our analysis of the principal-agent model
of outsourcing with related work in the literature.1 As in Sappington (1983), Lewis
and Sappington (2000) and Laffont and Martimort (2002), we derive a contract with
limited liability constraints, and show how these constraints create a limited liability
rent that accrues to the agent. More recently, Grossman and Helpman (2004) take
an incentive scheme approach to explore the production decision in a model with
limited liability constraints. They focus on the trade-off between greater monitoring
under vertical integration and high-powered incentives for effort under outsourcing.
We extend this literature by examining the link between the firms’ capital structure
and the production decision. Moreover, contrary to Grossman and Helpman (2004),
we focus on costs differential as the main motivation for firms to outsource.
There is both empirical and anecdotal evidence that firms outsource to take ad-
1Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Laffont and Martimort (2002), Salanie (1999) and Hart (1995)
provide extensive analysis of the main models on the theory of incentives.
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vantage of cost differentials. Fixler and Siegel (1999) show that the propensity of
a firm to outsource is a function of the difference between the price or marginal
cost of the product or service and the marginal cost of in house production. Among
the determinants for these cost differentials are differences in wages, the use of su-
perior technology, economies of scale, or monitoring and transaction cost savings.
Domberger (1999) and Greaver (1999) refer the existence of anecdotal evidence
where one of the main reasons for outsourcing is “functional specialization", allow-
ing the supplier to produce at a lower cost. Theoretical models that examine the
choice between outsourcing and vertical integration have also incorporated cost dif-
ferentials as a motive for outsourcing. The main contributions in this field include
Grossman and Helpman (2002), McLaren (2000) and Antras and Helpman (2004)
in the incomplete contracting or transaction economics literature, and Buehler and
Haucap (2006), Chen (2001) and Shy and Stenbacka (2003) in the literature that
has highlighted the role of strategic competition for a firm’s decision to outsource.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the
equilibrium when debt is issued. Section 3 concludes. Proofs of all propositions are
given in the Appendix.
2 The model with debt
In this section we assume that the surplus from the outsourcing regime is greater
than the limited liability rent captured by the supplier, such that the supplier can
use debt as an instrument to collect this surplus, i.e. pi0
∆pi
ψS ≤ M − ψS. We follow
closely the structure of the previous setting with cash, considering now the relevant
adjustments to the model implied by the introduction of debt on each firms’ capital
structure. We start off with the assumption that both firms’ debt is exogenously
given and subsequently derive the equilibrium capital structure under outsourcing.
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Let us then specify some of the new features of the model with debt in order
to determine the equilibrium with exogenous debt. At time t = 0 the buyer and
the supplier have in their capital structure a pure discount debt with face values
of DB and DS, respectively. Analogously as before, at this time the buyer offers a
contract
(
t, t
)
and at time t = 1 the supplier accepts or refuses the contract. In case
of acceptance, at time t = 2 the supplier exerts effort or not. Then, at time t = 3
the stochastic value of production S˜ is realized and at time t = 4 the contract is
executed and the face values of debt DB and DS are paid.
The introduction of debt, particularly in the supplying side, creates an important
difference between this framework and the one with cash holdings, when we end up
in the bad state of nature. While in the model with cash holdings the realization of
S is fully captured by the buyer, here we assume that the creditors of the supplying
firm can claim some of this value of production. This may occur when the transfer
payment t received by the supplier is not enough to pay the face value of debt
DS to the creditors (t − DS < 0), i.e. when the supplier’s debt is risky. In that
case, we assume the existence of a priority rule over S, where the creditors of the
supplying firm receive a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the realized value of production (up to
the maximum that is the face value of debt DS) and the buyer receives (1− α).2 If
α = 0 the buyer has strict priority over S, whereas if α = 1 it is the creditors of the
supplying firm who have strict priority over S. When S is realized, two cases can
arise: either the realized value of production is higher than the supplier’s face value
of debt, S ≥ DS, or it is lower, S < DS. Therefore, in what follows we define the
payoffs to the firms’ creditors for each of these cases.
Furthermore, whenever the buyer’s or the supplier’s debt is risky, we assume the
existence of bankruptcy costs that are captured by a parameter δi ∈ [0, 1] with i
2Without loss of generality, we assume that the outsourcing contract specifies ex-ante through
this absolute priority rule how the value of production is shared between the supplier’s creditors
and the buyer, when S is realized. In bankruptcy it is assumed that this rule is legally binding.
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∈ {B, S} and where B stands for buyer and S for supplier. If δi = 0 we are in the
extreme case of no bankruptcy costs.
Under these assumptions, it follows that if S ≥ DS, the payoffs to the creditors of
the buyer and the supplier are, respectively: min [DB, (S − t−max(DS − t, 0)α) (1− δB)]
and [min [DS, t] + max [DS − t, 0]α (1− δS)]. If, however, S < DS, the payoffs are,
respectively: min [DB, (1− α) (S − t) (1− δB)] and min [DS, t+ (S − t)α (1− δS)].
Now, we are in a position to specify the value functions of each claimant par-
ticipating in the outsourcing regime. Consider first the supplier. The values of
equityholders’ and debtholders’ claims are SEquityOe=1 and SDebtOe=1. The claims
add up to the total firm value, SOe=1 = SEquityOe=1 + SDebtOe=1. It follows that the
equity value is given by:
SEquityOe=1 = pi1 max
[
t−DS, 0
]
+ (1− pi1) max [t−DS, 0]− ψS (1)
whereas the debt values for S ≥ DS and S < DS are, respectively:
SDebtOe=1 = pi1 min
[
DS, t
]
+ (1− pi1) [min [DS, t] + max [DS − t, 0]α (1− δS)] (2)
SDebtOe=1 = pi1 min
[
DS, t
]
+ (1− pi1) min [DS, t+ (S − t)α (1− δS)] (3)
As regards the buyer, the value functions of equity, BEquityOe=1, and debt,
BDebtOe=1, for S ≥ DS are given by:
BEquityOe=1 = pi1 max
(
S − t−DB, 0
)
+(1− pi1) max (S − t−max(DS − t, 0)α−DB, 0)
(4)
BDebtOe=1 = pi1 min
[
DB, S − t
]
+(1− pi1) min [DB, (S − t−max(DS − t, 0)α) (1− δB)]
(5)
and for S < DS these are defined as:
BEquityOe=1 = pi1 max
(
S − t−DB, 0
)
+(1− pi1) max ((1− α) (S − t)−DB, 0) (6)
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BDebtOe=1 = pi1 min
[
DB, S − t
]
+ (1− pi1) min [DB, (1− α) (S − t) (1− δB)] (7)
The buyer optimizes the firm value, BOe=1 = BEquityOe=1 + BDebtOe=1, selecting
the contract
(
t, t
)
that satisfies the supplier’s incentive, participation and limited
liability constraints. The supplier’s incentive constraint, SEquityOe=1 ≥ SEquityOe=0,
now simplifies to:
pi1 max
[
t−DS, 0
]
+ (1− pi1) max [t−DS, 0]− ψS
≥ pi0 max
[
t−DS, 0
]
+ (1− pi0) max [t−DS, 0] (8)
The participation constraint, SEquityOe=1 ≥ 0, is given by:
pi1 max
[
t−DS, 0
]
+ (1− pi1) max [t−DS, 0]− ψS ≥ 0 (9)
Finally, the supplier’s limited liability constraints are:
t ≥ 0 (10)
t ≥ 0 (11)
Using similar techniques as before, one can show that the optimal compensation
scheme that solves the buyer’s problem is the one that considers as binding both the
incentive and the limited liability constraints (8) and (11), respectively. Proposition
1 summarizes the equilibrium transfer payments with exogenous debt.
Proposition 1 Assume that prior to the acceptance of the outsourcing contract by
the supplier, the buyer and the supplier hold and exogenous debt level DB and DS,
respectively. The equilibrium transfer payments of the outsourcing contract are:
t
∗
=
1
∆pi
ψS +DS (12)
t∗ = 0 (13)
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While in the bad state of nature there is no reward to the supplier through the
compensation scheme, there is a reward in the good state that incorporates the
debt payment that has to be made to the supplier’s creditors. Moreover, since the
supplier’s transfer payment in the bad state of nature is zero, it follows that the
firm’s debt is always risky.
In order to derive the equilibrium value functions for an exogenous amount of
each firms’ debt, we need to substitute the equilibrium transfer payments into the
value functions above. Furthermore, we have to define under which conditions the
buyer’s debt is safe or risky as risky debt is associated with bankruptcy costs that
do not arise with safe debt. From the buyer’s equity value function we know that
the buyer’s debt is safe if S − t − max(DS − t, 0)α ≥ DB and risky if otherwise.
As in equilibrium t∗ = 0 (see proposition 1), the conditions for the buyer’s safe and
risky debt simplify to S − αDS ≥ DB and S − αDS < DB, respectively.
Propositions 2 and 3 summarize the equilibrium with exogenous debt when the
buyer’s debt is safe and risky, respectively. With the results of proposition 2 alone
we can discuss the effect of the supplier’s debt on the buyer’s outsourcing decision,
whereas with the results of proposition 3 we can analyze the additional effect of the
buyer’s bankruptcy costs.
Proposition 2 Assume that prior to the acceptance of the outsourcing contract by
the supplier, the buyer and the supplier hold and exogenous debt level DB and DS,
respectively. If the buyer’s debt is safe, i.e. if S − αDS ≥ DB, the equilibrium firm
value of the buyer, BOe=1, is given by:
BOe=1 = pi1S + (1− pi1)S − ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
−DS [pi1 + (1− pi1)α] for S ≥ DS
BOe=1 = pi1S + (1− pi1)S − ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
− pi1DS − (1− pi1)αS for S < DS
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As for the supplier, the equilibrium firm value, SOe=1, is:
SOe=1 =
pi0
∆pi
ψS +DS [pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δS)] for S ≥ DS
SOe=1 =
pi0
∆pi
ψS + pi1DS + (1− pi1)αS (1− δS) for S < DS
The net gain to the buyer from the outsourcing regime is:
GainBOe=1 = M − ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
−DS [pi1 + (1− pi1)α] for S ≥ DS (14)
GainBOe=1 = M − ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
− pi1DS − (1− pi1)αS for S < DS (15)
where the expressions forM are as previously stated. The supplier’s optimal reaction
with debt occurs if pi0
∆pi
ψS ≤M − ψS.
When the buyer’s debt is safe, the expressions for the firm value of each player
are influenced by two different effects: the limited liability effect and the supplier’s
debt effect. If we ignore the debt effect, i.e. if DS = 0, one can verify that we end
up with the same results of the model with zero cash holdings: the supplier’s value,
pi0
∆pi
ψS, derives entirely from the limited liability rent, and the buyer’s value is just
the expected value of production, pi1S+ (1− pi1)S, minus the sum of supplier’s cost
of effort and supplier’s limited liability rent, ψS
(
1 + pi0
∆pi
)
.
Yet, given the assumption that the surplus from the outsourcing contract ex-
ceeds the supplier’s limited liability rent ( pi0
∆pi
ψS ≤ M − ψS), the supplier can use
debt as a strategic instrument to collect some of this surplus. In fact, as the sup-
plier issues debt, its firm value is now augmented with one component equal to
the expected payoff to the creditors (DS [pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δS)] for S ≥ DS and
pi1DS + (1− pi1)αS (1− δS) for S < DS), and the buyer’s firm value is reduced by
the same component, with the exception of the term associated with the supplier’s
bankruptcy costs (1− δS).3 Therefore, from proposition 2, we conclude that the
3The buyer’s firm value is not a function of these bankruptcy costs because they are fully
incurred by the supplier’s creditors.
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supplier’s debt has a positive effect on its total firm value and a negative effect on
the buyer’s. The supplier issues debt to receive a higher transfer payment in the the
good state of nature, and consequently to claim more rents from the outsourcing
contract, as debt increases the firm’s bargaining power.
Note, however, that the supplier’s potential to capture those rents depends on
two important effects: the level of bankruptcy costs associated with the firm’s debt
(captured by δS) and the level of priority that its creditors have over the realized
value of production in the bad state of nature S (as measured by α).4 As to be
expected, the supplier’s firm value depends negatively on the level of bankruptcy
costs associated with debt and positively on the level of priority that its creditors
have over the realized value of production. Now, let us examine the changes to the
equilibrium assuming that the buyer’s debt is risky.
Proposition 3 Assume that prior to the acceptance of the outsourcing contract by
the supplier, the buyer and the supplier hold and exogenous debt level DB and DS,
respectively. If the buyer’s debt is risky, i.e. if S−αDS < DB, the equilibrium total
firm value of the buyer, BOe=1, for S ≥ DS and S < DS is, respectively:
BOe=1 = pi1S + (1− pi1)S (1− δB)− ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
−DS [pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δB)]
BOe=1 = pi1S + (1− pi1)S (1− δB)− ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
− pi1DS − (1− pi1)αS (1− δB)
As for the supplier, the equilibrium total firm value, SOe=1, is:
SOe=1 =
pi0
∆pi
ψS +DS [pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δS)] for S ≥ DS
SOe=1 =
pi0
∆pi
ψS + pi1DS + (1− pi1)αS (1− δS) for S < DS
4As noted earlier, α is the proportion of the realized value of production S that is captured by
the supplier’s creditors.
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The net gain to the buyer from the outsourcing regime for S ≥ DS and S < DS is,
respectively:
GainBOe=1 = M− (1− pi1)SδB−ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
−DS [pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δB)] (16)
GainBOe=1 = M − (1− pi1)SδB−ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
−pi1DS− (1− pi1)αS (1− δB) (17)
where the expressions forM are as previously stated. The supplier’s optimal reaction
with debt occurs if pi0
∆pi
ψS+(1− pi1)SδB ≤M−ψS. The buyer’s gain from outsourcing
depends negatively on the level of bankruptcy costs δB.
The only difference between proposition 2 and proposition 3 comes from the fact
that with the buyer’s risky debt (S − αDS < DB), there is a value loss caused by
the buyer’s positive bankruptcy costs. These bankruptcy costs reduce the payoff
to the buyer’s creditors in the bad state of nature by δB (S − αDS) for S ≥ DS
and δB (1− α)S for S < DS. Therefore, the buyer’s firm value with outsourcing is
reduced, and as a consequence the buyer’s gain from outsourcing is also reduced.
Since the supplier uses debt as an instrument to capture those gains, this sug-
gests that whether the buyer’s debt is safe or risky has an effect on the supplier’s
equilibrium reaction with debt. The new condition for the supplier’s equilibrium
reaction with debt stated in proposition 3, pi0
∆pi
ψS + (1− pi1)SδB ≤ M − ψS, shows
that when the buyer’s debt is risky, the supplier can only issue positive debt if the
surplus from the outsourcing contract, M − ψS, is enough not only to compensate
the supplier’s limited liability rent, pi0
∆pi
ψS, as in proposition 2, but also the buyer’s
bankruptcy costs associated with debt, (1− pi1)SδB. Hence, it is important to ex-
amine next the implications that the buyer’s choice of safe versus risky debt can
have on the derivation of the supplier’s equilibrium capital structure.
Let us consider that at time t = 0 the supplier decides on the equilibrium debt
level D∗S and the buyer on whether to outsource with safe or risky debt. The
11
equilibrium is obtained by the intersection of each firms’ reaction functions to the
other’s debt level. First, consider the buyer’s reaction to the debt level set by the
supplier. We have shown that the buyer’s debt is safe when S − αDS ≥ DB and
risky if otherwise. It follows that the buyer’s best reaction to any level of DS ≤ Sα
that keeps his debt safe is given by:
DB ≤ S − αDS (18)
In addition to this reaction function, we need to ensure that the buyer’s equity value
remains positive for any level of debt. This extra condition is given by:5
DB ≤
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
)
−DS (19)
Alternatively, the buyer’s debt is always risky if DS > Sα . For this additional
case, once again, inequality (19) has to be satisfied. From (18), one can verify that
for a given level of the buyer’s and the supplier’s debt, DB and DS, respectively,
a lower (higher) realized value of production in the bad state of nature (S) and a
higher (lower) level of priority of the supplier’s creditors over this value (as captured
by α) increases the chances of the buyer’s debt being risky (safe). This result is
very intuitive: as the proportion of the realized value of production captured by the
supplier’s creditors increases (as α increases), less remains to be collected by the
buyer’s creditors, and consequently the higher is the probability of the buyer’s debt
being risky.
The supplier can set two debt levels that not only maximize the firm value but
also ensure that the net gain to the buyer from outsourcing is zero, i.e. there are
two debt levels that provide the supplier the whole surplus from the outsourcing
contract. We denote these debt levels by DS
(
DSAFEB
)
and DS
(
DRISKYB
)
. The level
DS
(
DSAFEB
)
is the one that provides a zero gain to the buyer when he outsources
5See derivation of inequality (19) in the Appendix.
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with safe debt, whereas the level DS
(
DRISKYB
)
ensures a zero gain, but now when
he outsources with risky debt. These debt levels are obtained precisely by solving
the net gain equations previously derived in propositions 2 and 3 for DS such that
the buyer breaks even. These are given by:
DS
(
DSAFEB
)
=
M − ψS
(
1 + pi0
∆pi
)
pi1 + (1− pi1)α (20)
DS
(
DRISKYB
)
=
M − ψS
(
1 + pi0
∆pi
)− (1− pi1)SδB
pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δB) (21)
The supplier’s best reaction to any debt level set by the buyer will depend on
the relation between these two expressions. We show that:
If DS ≤ S
α
=⇒ DS
(
DSAFEB
) ≥ DS (DRISKYB ) (22)
If DS >
S
α
=⇒ DS
(
DSAFEB
) ≤ DS (DRISKYB ) (23)
It turns out that for DS ≤ Sα , the supplier’s best reaction to any level of the buyer’s
debt is given by the functions DS = DS
(
DSAFEB
)
if the buyer’s safe debt condition
(18) is not binding, i.e. for 0 ≤ DB < S − αDS
(
DSAFEB
)
; DS = S−DBα if the buyer’s
safe debt condition is binding, i.e. for S−αDS
(
DSAFEB
) ≤ DB < S−αDS (DRISKYB );
and DS = DS
(
DRISKYB
)
if the buyer’s safe debt condition is not satisfied, i.e. for
DB > S − αDS
(
DRISKYB
)
.
On the other hand, for DS > Sα , where the buyer’s debt is always risky, the
supplier’s best reaction is to set DS equal to DS
(
DRISKYB
)
such that the buyer
breaks even. All these reaction functions are once again constrained by inequality
(19) of the buyer’s positive equity value.
Using the intersection of the reactions functions above, the buyer’s positive equity
constraint (19), and the results of propositions 2 and 3, one can show that the
equilibrium with endogenous debt is the one summarized in proposition 4.
13
Proposition 4 Assume that prior to the acceptance of the outsourcing contract, the
supplier decides on the amount of debt DS to issue, and the buyer on whether to
outsource with safe or risky debt.
1) If
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α ≤
S
α
, the buyer outsources with safe debt and the supplier sets the
following equilibrium debt level:
• D∗S = DS
(
DSAFEB
)
=
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α if both the buyer’s safe debt condition (18)
and positive equity condition (19) are not binding;
• D∗S = S−DBα if the buyer’s safe debt condition (18) is binding; and
• D∗S =
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
)−DB if the buyer’s positive equity condition (19) is binding.
2) Conversely, if
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α >
S
α
, the buyer outsources with risky debt and the
supplier sets the following equilibrium debt level:
• D∗S = DS
(
DRISKYB
)
=
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )−(1−pi1)SδB
pi1+(1−pi1)α(1−δB) if the buyer’s positive equity
condition (19) is not binding; and
• D∗S =
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
)−DB if the buyer’s positive equity condition (19) is binding.
Proposition 4 states the set of parameters for which the buyer outsources with
safe or risky debt. Outsourcing with safe debt occurs when
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α ≤
S
α
,
whereas outsourcing with risky debt occurs when the opposite is verified, i.e. when
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α >
S
α
. The intuition behind these two inequalities is simple. First, let us
assume the case where the creditors of the supplying firm have strict priority over
the realized value of production in the bad state of nature, i.e. α = 1. It follows
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that, under this assumption, the set of parameters to have the buyer outsourcing
with safe and risky debt simplifies to (24) and (25), respectively.
M − ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
≤ S (24)
M − ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
> S (25)
The results show that the buyer outsources with safe (risky) debt if the sur-
plus of the outsourcing contract, net of the supplier’s limited liability rent (M −
ψS
(
1 + pi0
∆pi
ψS
)
) is lower (higher) than the realized value of production in the bad
state of nature (S). Since this surplus (M − ψS) is either given by ψB − ψS or
∆pi∆S − ψS, this suggests that outsourcing with risky debt is more likely to oc-
cur when there are higher effort cost differences between internal production and
outsourcing (higher ψB − ψS) and greater benefit from exerting effort, in particular
greater wedge in the probabilities associated with each state of nature and higher
volatility in the values of production (higher ∆pi∆S).
Second, let us assume that the creditors of the supplying firm do not have strict
priority over S, i.e. 0 ≤ α < 1. From proposition 4, one can verify that as the
proportion of the realized value of production S collected by the buyer’s creditors
is increased, i.e.. as α decreases, there is naturally more scope to have the buyer
outsourcing with safe debt.
We use Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 to illustrate the results of the equilibrium with
endogenous debt. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 depict the equilibrium when the buyer out-
sources with safe debt and
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α ≤
S
α
, whereas Figure 4.3 considers the case
where he outsources with risky debt and
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α >
S
α
. Let us first analyze
Figure 4.1 where the condition for the buyer’s positive equity (19) is not binding.
The supplier sets D∗S equal to DS
(
DSAFEB
)
for any level of the buyer’s debt between
zero and D1B. For this range the buyer breaks even and the supplier’s firm value
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium with Safe Debt and Positive Equity Condition not Binding
Level of debt issued by the supplier, DS , as a function of the level of debt issued by the buyer, DB . Constraint (18),
given by DB ≤ S−αDS , is the buyer’s safe debt condition, and constraint (19), given by DB ≤
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
)−DS ,
is the buyer’s positive equity condition. In this example, the buyer’s positive equity condition is not binding the
equilibrium and the buyer’s debt is always safe. DS
(
DSAFEB
)
and DS
(
DRISKYB
)
are the supplier’s debt levels
that ensure the buyer to break even when the buyer’s debt is safe and risky, respectively. There is a multiple
equilibrium where the supplier adopts the debt level DS
(
DSAFEB
)
if the buyer’s safe debt condition is not binding
(DB < S − αDS
(
DSAFEB
) ≡ D1B) and DS = S−DBα if the buyer’s safe debt condition is binding (D1B ≤ DB <
S − αDS
(
DRISKYB
) ≡ D4B).
becomes:
SOe=1 =
pi0
∆pi
ψS +
M − ψS
(
1 + pi0
∆pi
)
pi1 + (1− pi1)α [pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δS)] (26)
From this expression it is clear that if the supplier’s bankruptcy costs are zero
(δS = 0), the supplier’s firm value simplifies to the outsourcing surplus: M − ψS.
The supplier reaps all the gains from the outsourcing contract and still ensures the
buyer’s participation. As we discussed earlier, this value is reduced if there are
positive bankruptcy costs (0 < δS ≤ 1) or if supplier’s creditors do not have strict
priority over the realized value of production S in the bad state of nature (0 <
α < 1). Furthermore, for any level of the buyer’s debt between D1B and D4B, the
buyer’s safe debt condition is binding and the suppliers sets the equilibrium debt as
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium with Safe Debt and Positive Equity Condition Binding
Level of debt issued by the supplier, DS , as a function of the level of debt issued by the buyer, DB . Constraint (18),
given by DB ≤ S−αDS , is the buyer’s safe debt condition, and constraint (19), given by DB ≤
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
)−DS , is
the buyer’s positive equity condition. In this example, the buyer’s positive equity condition is binding the equilibrium
for D0B ≤ DB ≤ D2B and the buyer’s debt is always safe. DS
(
DSAFEB
)
and DS
(
DRISKYB
)
are the supplier’s debt
levels that ensure the buyer to break even when the buyer’s debt is safe and risky, respectively. There is a multiple
equilibrium where the supplier adopts the debt level DS
(
DSAFEB
)
if the buyer’s positive equity condition is not
binding (DB <
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
) − DS (DSAFEB ) ≡ D0B), DS = (S − 1∆piψS) − DB if the buyer’s positive equity
condition is binding (D0B ≤ DB ≤
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
)−DS ≡ D2B) and DS = S−DBα if the buyer’s safe debt condition is
binding (D2B < DB < S − αDS
(
DRISKYB
) ≡ D4B).
D∗S =
S−DB
α
, sharing the surplus of the outsourcing contract with the buyer. The
proportion of the surplus collected by the supplier (buyer) decreases (increase) as
the buyer’s debt increases from D1B to D4B. Although all these debt combinations
are part of the equilibrium, only one of them configures a situation where the total
value generated with outsourcing by both firms is maximized. We show that from
a global optimization point of view, as soon as there are positive bankruptcy costs,
the equilibrium
(
D4B, D
∗
S =
S−D4B
α
)
is preferable as this is the one that minimizes the
supplier’s debt level, and consequently the value loss caused by bankruptcy costs.
Figure 4.2 provides an example where the condition for the buyer’s positive equity
(19) is binding for some part of the equilibrium. The difference now is that for the
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Figure 4.3: Equilibrium with Risky Debt
Level of debt issued by the supplier, DS , as a function of the level of debt issued by the buyer, DB . DS
(
DSAFEB
)
and
DS
(
DRISKYB
)
are the supplier’s debt levels that ensure the buyer to break even when the buyer’s debt is safe and
risky, respectively. In this example the buyer’s debt is always risky. Constraint (19), given by DB ≤
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
)−
DS , is the buyer’s positive equity condition. There is a multiple equilibrium where the supplier adopts the debt level
DS
(
DRISKYB
)
if the buyer’s positive equity condition is not binding (DB <
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
)−DS (DRISKYB ) ≡ D5B)
and DS =
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
) − DB if the buyer’s positive equity condition is binding (D5B ≤ DB < (S − 1∆piψS) −
DS
(
DSAFEB
) ≡ D6B).
range D0B < DB ≤ D2B the equilibrium is given by D∗S =
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
)−DB instead
of DS
(
DSAFEB
)
or D∗S =
S−DB
α
as in Figure 4.1. For the same reason as before,
equilibrium
(
D4B, D
∗
S =
S−D4B
α
)
is preferable from a global optimization perspective.
Finally, in Figure 4.3, when
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α >
S
α
and the buyer’s debt is always risky,
the supplier sets D∗S equal to DS
(
DRISKYB
)
when condition (19) is not binding, i.e.
for DB ≤ D5B. For this level the buyer’s net gain from outsourcing is zero and the
supplier’s firm value is:
SOe=1 =
pi0
∆pi
ψS +
M − ψS
(
1 + pi0
∆pi
)− (1− pi1)SδB
pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δB) [pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δS)] (27)
Only when there are no bankruptcy costs (δB and δS are zero), the supplier is
able to collect the maximum surplus from outsourcing: M − ψS. On the other
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hand, when the buyer’s positive equity condition is binding, the supplier sets D∗S =(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
) − DB for the range D5B < DB ≤ D6B. Once again, from a global
optimization point of view, the equilibrium with the supplier’s lowest debt level(
D6B, D
∗
S =
(
S − 1
∆pi
ψS
)−D6B) is preferable as it minimizes the value loss caused by
bankruptcy costs.
3 Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of capital structure on the production decision of
firms in a principal-agent framework.
As the advantage from the outsourcing regime increases, such that the surplus
from outsourcing is enough to cover the supplier’s limited liability rent, the supplier
can switch from accumulating cash to issuing debt. We find that the supplier has an
incentive to use as much debt as possible because the proportion of the outsourcing
surplus the firm collects depends positively on debt. Our model shows, however,
that the supplier’s potential to collect this surplus depends negatively on its level
of bankruptcy costs and positively on the level of priority that the firm’s creditors
have over the value of production at liquidation.
Next, we investigate the effect of the buyer’s choice of safe versus risky debt on
the supplier’s capital structure, as with risky debt we have the additional effect of
bankruptcy costs. Our results show that when the buyer’s debt is risky, a greater
surplus from outsourcing is required to have an equilibrium where the supplier issues
debt since bankruptcy costs reduces the buyer’s total firm value under outsourcing
and the incentives to outsource.
Finally, we derive the buyer’s equilibrium capital structure, and find that the
buyer’s decision to outsource with safe versus risky debt depends on the surplus
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from outsourcing and how it compares with the realized value of production in the
bad state of nature. Greater advantage from the outsourcing contract allows an
equilibrium where the buyer outsources with risky debt.
Our model provides new predictions that can be empirically testable. We find
that the supplier switches from accumulating cash to issuing debt as the surplus
from outsourcing increases, i.e. as the cost differential between the buyer and the
supplier increases, or as the benefit associated with the supplier’s effort increases.
As discussed earlier, this latter benefit is linked with greater probabilities of reaching
high values of production in good states of nature and with high volatilities in the
values of production. Moreover, the buyer’s debt level also depends positively on this
surplus. Therefore, our model predicts that in more volatile industries (for example,
in industries more affected by economic shocks) and in industries where the level
of efficiency of suppliers is greater, firms involved in outsourcing (both buyers and
suppliers) may show high leverage. Rather, in stable industries or with low level of
efficiency of suppliers, firms tend to participate in the outsourcing relationship with
safer capital structures, or even accumulating high levels of cash.
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4 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
The transfer payments with exogenous debt are derived analogously as in the
proof of proposition ?? when both the incentive and limited liability constraint
are binding, i.e. by solving the incentive constraint (8) and the limited liability
constraint (11) with equalities. These payments t∗ = 1
∆pi
ψS +DS and t∗ = 0 ensure
that condition (10) is satisfied since t∗ = 1
∆pi
ψS+DS > 0 and that (9) is also satisfied
since SEquityOe=1 = pi1 max
[
t−DS, 0
]
+ (1− pi1) max [t−DS, 0]− ψS = pi0∆piψS ≥ 0.
Proof of proposition 2
Analogously to the proof of proposition ??, we obtain the equilibrium values
by substituting the transfer payments derived in proposition 1 into the appropriate
value functions, assuming the condition for the buyer’s safe debt S − t−max(DS −
t, 0)α ≥ DB. The buyer’s total firm value is BOe=1 = BDebtOe=1 +BEquityOe=1, where
the equilibrium value of debt, BDebtOe=1, is DB and the equilibrium value of equity,
BEquityOe=1, is:
BEquityOe=1 = pi1S+(1− pi1)S−ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
−DS [pi1 + (1− pi1)α]−DB for S ≥ DS
BEquityOe=1 = pi1S+(1− pi1)S−ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
−pi1DS−(1− pi1)αS−DB for S < DS
As for the supplier, the total firm value is SOe=1 = SDebtOe=1 +SEquityOe=1, where
the equilibrium equity value, SEquityOe=1, equals the limited liability rent debt
pi0
∆pi
ψS,
and the equilibrium debt value, SDebtOe=1, is:
SDebtOe=1 = DS [pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δS)] for S ≥ DS
SDebtOe=1 = pi1DS + (1− pi1)αS (1− δS) for S < DS
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The condition for the supplier’s optimal reaction with debt pi0
∆pi
ψS ≤ M − ψS
is derived with an analogous procedure to the one used in proposition ??. First,
we determine the level of debt that ensures to the buyer a net gain of zero. We
solve the net gain expression stated in proposition 2 for DS and we obtain that
DS equals
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α . An equilibrium reaction with positive debt implies then
condition DS ≥ 0 to hold, i.e. M−ψS(1+
pi0
∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α ≥ 0. After simplifying, this inequality
becomes: pi0
∆pi
ψS ≤M − ψS.
Proof of proposition 3
This proposition is derived with the same steps as proposition 2, assuming now
the condition for the buyer’s risky debt S− t−max(DS − t, 0)α < DB. The buyer’s
firm value is BOe=1 = BDebtOe=1 + BEquityOe=1, where the equilibrium value of debt,
BDebtOe=1, is:
BDebtOe=1 = pi1DB + (1− pi1) (S − αDS) (1− δB) for S ≥ DS
BDebtOe=1 = pi1DB + (1− pi1) (1− α)S (1− δB) for S < DS
and the equilibrium value of equity, BEquityOe=1, is:
BEquityOe=1 = pi1S − ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
− pi1DS − pi1DB
On the other hand, the supplier’s firm value is SOe=1 = SDebtOe=1 + SEquityOe=1,
where the expressions for the equilibrium equity value, SEquityOe=1, and debt value,
SDebtOe=1, are the same as the ones stated in the previous proof.
The condition for the supplier’s optimal reaction with debt pi0
∆pi
ψS+(1− pi1)SδB ≤
M − ψS is obtained with the same intuition as in proposition 2. Solving the
buyer’s net gain for DS gives that DS equals
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )−(1−pi1)SδB
pi1+(1−pi1)α(1−δB) . In order for
this amount of debt to be positive the following condition has to be satisfied:
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )−(1−pi1)SδB
pi1+(1−pi1)α(1−δB) ≥ 0. This simplifies to: pi0∆piψS + (1− pi1)SδB ≤M − ψS.
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Finally, we show that the buyer’s gain from outsourcing depends negatively on
bankruptcy costs as:
∂GainBOe=1
∂δB
= − (1− pi1) (S − αDS) < 0 for S ≥ DS and
∂GainBOe=1
∂δB
= − (1− pi1)S (1− α) < 0 for S < DS.
Derivation of condition (19) for the buyer’s positive equity value
The buyer’s equity value with risky debt is stated in the proof of proposition 3
as BEquityOe=1 = pi1S −
(
ψS +
pi0
∆pi
ψS
) − pi1DS − pi1DB. Condition (19) is obtained
by solving BEquityOe=1 ≥ 0 for DB.
Proof of conditions (22) and (23)
We show that the inequalityDS
(
DSAFEB
) ≥ DS (DRISKYB ) given by M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )pi1+(1−pi1)α ≥
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )−(1−pi1)SδB
pi1+(1−pi1)α(1−δB) simplifies to DS
(
DSAFEB
)
=
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α ≤
S
α
. Therefore, for
DS ≤ Sα condition (22) is verified. From this, it follows immediately that for the
opposite case DS > Sα , condition (23) is also verified.
Proof of proposition 4
We derive the results of proposition 4 by simply using the intersection of the
firm’s reactions functions and the buyer’s positive equity constraint (19). The equi-
librium condition to have the buyer outsourcing with safe debt,
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α ≤
S
α
,
is obtained as follows. We have shown previously that when the buyer’s debt
is safe, condition DS
(
DSAFEB
) ≥ DS (DRISKYB ) is verified, and this simplifies to
DS
(
DSAFEB
)
=
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α ≤
S
α
. Thus, the buyer outsources with safe debt when
M−ψS(1+ pi0∆pi )
pi1+(1−pi1)α ≤
S
α
. When the opposite holds the buyer outsources with risky debt.
Proof that the equilibrium with the lowest D∗S is preferred by a global
optimizer
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We show that as soon as the supplier’s bankruptcy costs are positive (0 < δS ≤
1), the value under global maximization depends negatively on the supplier’s debt,
and consequently the equilibrium that incorporates the lowest D∗S is preferred. Let
us consider the case where the buyer’s debt is safe as an example. We know from
proposition 2 that the buyer’s and the supplier’s firm value are, respectively:
BOe=1 = pi1S + (1− pi1)S − ψS
(
1 +
pi0
∆pi
)
−D∗S [pi1 + (1− pi1)α] (28)
SOe=1 =
pi0
∆pi
ψS +D
∗
S [pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δS)] (29)
The value under global maximization, GMOe=1 = BOe=1 + SOe=1, simplifies to:
GMOe=1 = pi1S+(1− pi1)S−ψS−D∗S [(pi1 + (1− pi1)α)− (pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δS))]
(30)
and ∂GM
O
e=1
∂D∗S
to:
∂GMOe=1
∂D∗S
= − [(pi1 + (1− pi1)α)− (pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δS))] (31)
As (pi1 + (1− pi1)α) ≥ (pi1 + (1− pi1)α (1− δS)), if follows that ∂GM
O
e=1
∂D∗S
≤ 0.
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